The political economy of roads reform in Uganda

An ODI/DFID study of the political economy of the roads sector in Uganda considered the impact of reforms that took place in 2008, including the establishment of a semi-autonomous National Roads Authority (UNRA) and the creation of a ring fenced road fund. The study concluded that the reforms had not fundamentally changed the nature of incentives in the sector. These remain part of the patronage system for distributing rents and ensuring political support and financing. However, while the overall balance of power and incentives are not favourable to reform, there are many actors with an interest in the improved performance of the sector. The study concluded that the reform process has created some additional room for manoeuvre where development agencies can operate to promote change. A particular challenge is to work to solve collective action problems that prevent individual actors breaking out of established patterns of behaviour. In this respect the study concluded that development agencies can play a vital role acting as a third party to broker meetings and agreements, and help the main players to overcome what would otherwise be situations of stalemate or logjam. It suggested donor action should be focussed on the following roles: communication about performance in the sector, brokering otherwise missing dialogue among key players, facilitation of countervailing networks of influence, lowering barriers to collective action by private actors, facilitating appropriate forms of 'infant industry' support to local firms, and mobilising influence to enable otherwise blocked organisational transformations.